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THE LIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER FOR THE WILFUL
TORTS OF HIS SERVANTS
RALPH L. BRILL*
THE DOCTRINE OF respondeat superior-let the master respond!
-is solidly entrenched in Anglo-American law. It is also, in
varying forms, applied in many European countries.' Mr. Justice
Holmes has traced the apparent origin of the doctrine to ancient
Greek and Roman laws which made the master of the family
responsible for the harm caused by his animals, his slaves and by
the members of his family.
2
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is held
vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of his servant committed
within the scope of the servant's employment.3 The employer's
liability is merely substituted for the servant's, whose wrongful
act caused the injury, and it is not dependent in any way upon the
fault of the master.
Since liability of the master is not based upon fault, it is not
surprising that the rule of respondeat superior has been criticized
by some legal scholars. Mr. Justice Holmes, for example, stated
that the doctrine was in opposition to common sense, 4 and
Thomas Baty said that the rule was "derived from an inconsid-
erate use of precedents and a blind reliance on the slightest word
* A.B. 1957, J.D. 1960 University of Illinois. Mr. Brill is presently an Associate
Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and is Faculty Adviser to the Chicago-
Kent Law Review.
1 Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444, 452-3 (1923); Neuner, Respondeat
Superior in the Light of Comparative Law, 4 La. L. Rev. 1 (1941).
2 Holmes, The Common Law, Lecture 1 (1881); Holmes, The History of Agency, 4
Harv. L. Rev. 345 & 5 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1891).
3 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 219 (1957).
4 Holmes, The History of Agency, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345 & 5 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1891).
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of an eminent judge [Lord Holt, in Jones v. Hart']; and from the
mistaken notion that his flights of imagination in picturing high-
way accidents were actual decided cases. ... "
There have been far more supporters of the rule than critics,
however, and numerous justifications have been offered for the
creation, continuance and expanded application of the principle.
Two early theories emphasized the employer's "control" over the
servant, and the "benefit" derived from his acts.7 Lord Brougham
combined these in one case when he said: "[B]y employing him,
I set the whole thing in motion, and what he does, being done for
my benefit, and under my direction, I am responsible for the
consequences of doing it."' A similar theory, the "implied com-
mand" theory, was popular for some time, and it justified liability
because the master had impliedly commanded the servant to com-
mit the harmful act." The "identification" theory rationalized re-
sponsibility because the victim who has been run down by a
Standard Oil truck feels that he has been injured by Standard Oil,
not simply by the driver of the truck.'0 Bentham and others advo-
cated holding the master liable as an incentive to making him
more careful in selecting competent and careful servants," a
premise that was used and has been borne out in the analogous
field of Workman's Compensation. 2
The most prevalent current theory rests on a base of broad
social policy. Baty, an opponent of the doctrine of respondeat
superior, called it the "deep-pocket" theory; 13 Young B. Smith, an
advocate of the doctrine, labelled it the "entrepeneur" theory.' 4
5 2 Salk. 441, 90 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1698). This case was the first judicial recognition,
in dicta, of the doctrine of respondeat superior. "For whoever employs another, is
answerable for him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use of him." Ibid.
6 Baty, Vicarious Liability 29 (1916).
7 Mechem, Agency § 1856 (2d ed. 1914); Wigmore, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History 536 (1909).
8 Duncan v. Finlater, Cl. & F. 894, 910 (1839).
9 Wigmore, supra note 7, at 474.
10 Mechem, Outlines Agency § 362 (4th ed. 1952); 2 Pollack & Maitland, History of
English Law 530 (1899).
11 Bentham, Collected Works i, 383 (1838); Pothier, Obligations 72 (1761); Morris,
The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 339-341 (1935); Seavey, Specula-
tions to Respondeat Superior, Studies in.Agency 129, 148 (1949).
12 Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444, 456 et seq. (1923); Seavey, supra
note 11, at 149.
13 Baty, Vicarious Liability 29 (1916).
14 Smith, supra note 12. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of
Risk, 38 Yale L.J. 584"(1929); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L.J. 105
(1916).
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Under this theory, respondeat superior is justified as a risk-spread-
ing device. It is recognized that servants are an "impecunious
race," and if the servant were unable to pay, the innocent victim
would have to bear his injuries without compensation. The
employer, however, can better bear the responsibility and spread
it on to society as a whole, mainly through insurance, with the
premiums passed on to the public through slightly higher charges
for the employer's product or services. As stated by Smith:
[I]t is socially more expedient to spread or distribute among a
large group of the community the losses which experience has
taught are inevitable in the carrying on of industry, than to cast
the loss upon a few.
.... [T]he loss will not fall on him alone. Like the employer under
workman's compensation statutes, it is feasible for him (through
the medium of insurance) to spread the loss among others carrying
on a similar business, and he can pass his proportionate part of
the loss (the insurance premium) in the form of slightly higher
charges to [his customers] and thus "the shock of the accident may
be borne by the community."' 5
Whatever the reasons for respondeat superior, it is clear that
the doctrine is black letter law today. For any tortious conduct
of the servant-negligent, reckless, intentional, or acts falling
within the class of strict liability-the employer will be held liable
so long as the conduct was within the scope of the employee's
employment. As always, the difficult problem is the application
of the rule. What conduct is within the scope of employment, or
at least may be said to be only a minor deviation from it? When
will the servant be said to have stepped aside from the employ-
ment to engage in a "frolic of his own?"'"
These questions are difficult enough when an employee does
something not clearly a part of his duties and negligently injures
another person; they are exceedingly difficult when there is sub-
stituted the fact that the servant has intentionally or maliciously
injured another person. This article will attempt to analyze the
master's liability for the wilful torts of his servant under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. In addition, some alternative theories
of liability of the employer will be examined. Following a general
15 Smith, supra note 12, at 457-8.
16 This is the phrase first used in Joel v. Morrison, 6 C. & P. 501, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338
(Exch. 1834), to describe a substantial deviation which would remove the servant from
the scope of his employment.
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analysis, the article will focus on the law of one jurisdiction, Illi-
nois, and the attempt to synthesize its cases.
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The early common law view was that a master was not liable
for injuries that had been wilfully inflicted by his servant. 7 A
partial explanation for this view was the then current justification
for respondeat superior, the "implied command" theory. It was
felt that while negligent conduct could reasonably be found to
have been impliedly commanded by the master, the master could
not reasonably be said to have ordered his servant to intentionally
cause harm.' In the leading case of Wright v. Wilcox, 19 a small
boy attempted to climb on an ice wagon driven by the defendant's
servant. The servant, seeing the boy's attempt, whipped the horses
into a trot, causing the boy to be thrown off under a wheel. Judge
Cowan ruled that the master was not responsible, since the servant
had apparently acted by design. The court said that "the dividing
line is the wilfulness of the act . . . ." and that to be responsible
"it must be proved that he [the master] actually assented, for the
law will not imply assent."20 Thus, only where express authority
to commit the wilful act existed-an express order to injure-
could the master be liable.
Gradually, as the implied command theory gave way to other
theories of justification, it came to be recognized that the wil-
fulness of the act and an intention to do injury did not, alone, take
the act outside the scope of employment, though the wilfulness of
the act made it more likely that the servant was acting for his own
purposes only.
One of the first kinds of cases in which it was recognized that
the master could be responsible for the wilful tort of his servant
was where the servant was in a position with actual authority to use
17 Huffcutt, Law of Agency 305-6 (1901); 2 Mechem, Agency § 1926 (2d ed. 1914);
Seavey, Studies in Agency 250-251 (1949).
18 Seavey, supra note 17.
'9 19 Wend. (N.Y.) 343, 32 Am. Dec. 507 (1838). See also Mali v. Lord, 39 N.Y. 381
(1868).
20 Ibid. See, e.g., Herring v. Hoppock, 15 N.Y. 409 (1854); Grossbart v. Samuel,
65 N.J.L. 543, 47 At. 501 (1900) (master yelled "give it to him, so he will keep his
mouth shut.").
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some force, but in the specific case mistook the need for it or ex-
ceeded the amount of force necessary. Most of these cases involved
employees in custodial positions, charged with the responsibility
of protecting the master's property, and authorized to use some
force to do so.
2 1
Thus, in Tripp v. American Tobacco Co.,22 the servant was
employed as a night watchman at the defendant's warehouse. The
servant saw the plaintiff walking near the warehouse and, thinking
him to be a trespasser and a pillager, the servant called to him and
ordered him to stop. When the plaintiff, who was properly on the
land, did not stop, the guard shot him in the chest. A finding that
the servant was in the scope of his employment was sustained.
Extension of liability to the use of force by custodial servants
was not a difficult step. In cases where a servant had negligently
injured another, the courts had emphasized the factors of time,
place and purpose to determine whether the servant was within
the scope of his employment.2 If the servant was within the time
limits of his job, and was at a place where he could properly be as
an incident of his job, or not substantially far from such a place,
and if he was actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master, the servant's negligent conduct was found to be within
the scope of his employment, even though not specifically autho-
rized. A servant who injured another by negligently speeding, for
example, was undoubtedly not specifically authorized to speed;
in fact, he may have been instructed not to drive in excess of a
fixed speed limit. Nevertheless, it was early recognized that if the
servant, while performing his duties, did speed and thereby in-
jured another, he was still within the scope of his employment.24
The servant was driving within the working hours of his job; he
had not deviated geographically from the space limitations of the
21 See, e.g., Stewart v. Reutler, 32 Cal. App. 2d 195, 89 P.2d 402 (1939) (bouncer);
J.J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S.W.2d 359 (1935) (store manager); Schmidt
v. Vanderveer, 110 App. Div. 755, 97 N.Y. Supp. 441 (1906) (guard); Ploof v. Putnam,
83 Vt. 252, 75 At. 277 (1910) (caretaker). See cases cited in Ferson, Principles of Agency
§ 70 (1954); Mechem, Outlines Agency § 396 (4th ed. 1952); Seavey, Studies in Agency
253-255 (1949); 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault & Battery § 140 (1963).
22 193 N.C. 614, 137 S.E. 871 (1927).
23 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 229(b) (1957); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 10, 12 (1957).
See, e.g., Fiocco v. Carver, 234 N.Y. 219, 137 N.E. 309 (1922).
24 See, e.g., Gillis v. Jurzyna, 284 Ill. App. 174, 1 N.E.2d 773 (Ist Dist. 1936).
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job; and he was still acting for the master's purposes. Since he
was performing the main act he was employed to perform-driv-
ing-the fact that he was doing it badly would not relieve the
master of responsibility.
25
By using the same reasoning, it would not be difficult to
establish the proposition that where the servant is authorized to
use force for the master's purposes, the fact that he has mistaken
the need for it, or that he has exceeded the amount of force re-
quired, should not, of itself, establish that the servant had stepped
aside from his employment. So long as the servant was still
within the time limits of his agency, had not geographically devi-
ated from it, and sought primarily to serve his master's interests,
the fact that he served him badly should not negate the master's
responsibility.
Of course, it was still possible to find that the servant who
had been authorized to use force had, in the specific case, acted
solely out of personal malice and not for a purpose connected with
the master's business. In such a case, the factors of time and space
would be present, but purpose would not. It was therefore held
that a servant who was authorized to use force, but who acted for
personal spite or revenge, was not acting within the scope of his
employment.
26
In addition to jobs in which the use of force is expressly
authorized, there are many kinds of employment in which an
employee, while not specifically told to do so, will commonly have
to use some force in order to do his job. An usher or a guard might
have to physically move someone back in line or restrain a person
from entering without authority. An employee sent to recapture
chattels may frequently have to overcome resistance from the
buyer of the article being repossessed. If the employee in one of
these positions should mistake the need for force, or exceed the
amount of force which he might be privileged to use, the factors
of time, place and purpose would still be present, and a finding
25 "Although Dollar was serving defendant badly, defendant was liable." Moore v.
Rosenmond, 238 N.Y. 358, 360, 144 N.E. 639, 640 (1924).
26 See Dagger v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 36 Ga. App. 782, 138 S.E. 266 (1927) (station
agent shot a person who objected to his failure to open the station); 6 Am. Jur. 2d,
Assault & Battery § 140 & n.9 (1963); Annot...34.AL.R.2d 372, 402-410 (1954).
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that the employee was within the scope of his employment could
be sustained.2 7 The servant was at and on his job, and was acting
for his employer's benefit.
To support a finding of liability in this kind of case, reference
can be made to general agency principles. A principal is liable for
contracts made by his agent within the scope of the agent's actual
or apparent authority.28 The agent's actual authority is not con-
fined, however, to the kinds of contracts or limitations expressly
outlined by the principal; the agent has an inherent or incidental
authority from his position to make contracts necessary and proper
to carry out his expressed authority, authority which is custom-
arily possessed by an agent in his position.2 9 A general manager of
a store has authority to order supplies for the store even if he has
not specifically been told that he can by his principal, since that
authority normally is possessed by a person in the position of gen-
eral manager, it is necessary and proper to carry out his duties,
and he has not been told not to make such contracts.80 By analogy,
it can be argued that although the employee who has resorted to
force for his employer's benefit was not expressly told that he could
use force as part of his job, the position the employee occupied is
27 See, e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. Brewer, 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910 (1941); Sturgis v. Kansas
City Ry. Co., 228 S.W. 861 (Mo. App. 1921); Rich v. Dugan, 135 Neb. 63, 280 N.W. 225
(1938); Dierkes v. Hauxhurst Land Co., 80 N.J.L. 369, 79 At. 361 (1911); Wilson v. Singer
Sewing Mach. Co., 184 N.C. 40, 113 S.E. 508 (1922). For other recapture of chattels cases,
see Ferson, Principles of Agency 103 (1954); Seavey, Agency 157 (1964); Seavey, Studies
in Agency 260 (1949); 57 C.J.S., Master & Servant § 575(c) (1948); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1180
(1920), supplemented, 105 A.L.R. 926 (1936). See also 1 Restatement (Second), Agency
§ 245, comment a & illustr. 3 (1957).
28 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 140 (1957).
29 "Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a transaction includes authority
to do acts which are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are reasonably necessary
to accomplish it." 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 35 (1957). See generally, Mechem,
Outlines Agency § 43 (4th ed. 1952).
80 "Unless otherwise agreed, authority to manage a business includes authority:
(a) to make contracts which are incidental to such business, are usually made in it,
or are reasonably necessary in conducting it;
(b) to procure equipment and supplies and to make repairs reasonably necessary for
the proper conduct of the business;
(c) to employ, supervise, or discharge employees as the course of business may
reasonably require;
(d) to sell or otherwise dispose of goods or other things in accordance with the
purposes for which the business is operated;
(e) to receive payment of sums due the principal and to pay debts due from the
principal arising out of the business enterpise; and
(f) to direct the ordinary operations of the business.
1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 73 (1957). See also 1 Restatement (Second), Agency
§ 8A (1957).
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commonly accompanied by the use of force, force was often neces-
sary to carry out his expressed duties, and the employer had not
instructed the employee not to use force.
Illustrative of this group of cases is Gerstein v. C.F. Adams
Co.31 There, the defendant's employees were sent to collect a bal-
ance due on a clock purchased by the plaintiff. The plaintiff told
them that she was unable to pay the full balance, but was told that
this was unacceptable and the clock would have to be repossessed.
The plaintiff tried to stop the men from taking the clock, and one
of the men struck her and caused her to fall. The Wisconsin court
found that the acts of the servants were within the scope of their
employment even though they were not authorized by the master.
The next kind of case in which scope of employment was
extended was where an employee, whose job did not usually in-
volve force, or who had in fact been told not to use force, com-
mitted a wilful act, but for the main purpose of serving his master.
For example, a theatre manager assaults a drunk who, after being
ejected from the theatre, has been cursing and yelling in front of
the theatre and urging patrons not to go inside. 2 Or the foreman
of a telephone company in charge of putting up telephone poles
has a landowner arrested in order to prevent the owner from inter-
fering, as he had threatened to do.33 In these cases, it may be
argued that the important factors of time, place and purpose are
reasonably established. The employee is working at his job and
performing the main act he was employed to perform. The wilful
act which he has committed was primarily for the purpose of serv-
ing his employer, though in his zeal it has turned out badly.
Though there is more disagreement than in the previous catego-
ries, 34 many cases have found that the employee who has overzeal-
ously acted for his master was still within the scope of his employ-
ment and not on a frolic of his own.33
31 169 Wis. 504, 173 N.W. 209 (1919).
32 Basket v. Banks, 186 Va. 1022, 45 S.E.2d 173 (1947).
33 Jackson v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 139 N.C. 347, 51 S.E. 1015 (1905).
34 See, e.g., Plotkin v. Northland Transp. Co., 204 Minn. 422, 283 N.W. 758 (1939);
Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, 219 Minn. 14, 16 N.W.2d 906 (1945); Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Guffey, 95 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Com. App. 1936).
35 See M.J. Uline Co. v. Cashdaw, 171 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (hockey player struck
fan instead of other player; for jury; could have been for purpose of winning or making
game interesting); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. White, 104 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1939) (assault
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The leading case in this category is Limpus v. London
General Omnibus Co.s6 The defendant's servant and the plaintiff
were drivers of competing buses. They had both attempted to pick
up the same three passengers, with the plaintiff being successful.
At the same time, the plaintiff stopped his bus in such a way as to
prevent the defendant's servant from passing, and thus gaining an
advantage for the next group of passengers. The defendant's bus
finally succeeded in passing, and when the plaintiff in turn tried
to pass, the defendant's servant intentionally pulled across the
road to block him, and caused the plaintiff's bus to overturn. The
trial judge charged the jury that if they believed
that the real truth of the matter was that the defendant's driver,
being dissatisfied and irritated with the plaintiff's driver, whether
justly or unjustly, by reason of what had occurred, and in that
state of mind acted recklessly, wantonly and improperly, but in
the course of his service and employment, and in doing that which
he believed to be for the interests of the defendants, then the de-
fendants were responsible for the act of their servant.8 7
The Court of Exchequer affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff, Wil-
les, J. stating: "He was employed not only to drive the omnibus,
which alone would not support this summing up, but also to get
as much money as he could for his master, and to do it in rivalry
with other omnibuses on the road.
' 8
Thus far, it has been established that the master may be liable
for wilful torts committed by a servant whose position involves the
use of force, such as a bouncer or a watchman, or by a servant
whose position is "not uncommonly accompanied by the use of
force,"3 9 such as a repossessor of chattels or an usher, or by a ser-
while questioning a suspect); McKay v. Irvine, 10 Fed. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1882) (jockey struck
competing jockey); Sullivan v. People's Ice Corp., 92 App. 740, 268 Pac. 934 (1928) (assault
on competitor); Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Ellington, 92 Ga. App. 24, 87 S.E.2d 665
(1955); Frances v. Barbazon, 16 La. App. 509, 134 So. 789 (1931); Nelson Bus. College v.
Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448, 54 N.E. 971 (1899).
36 1 H. & C. 526, 158 Eng. Rep. 993 (Exch. 1862).
37 Id. at 539, 158 Eng. Rep. at 998 (Emph. added).
38 Ibid.
39 Tenative Draft No. 4 of the Restatement (Second), Agency § 245, described the
master's liability for a servant's use of force as:
(1) A master who authorizes a servant to perform acts which involve the use
of force against persons or things, or which are of such a nature that they are
not uncommonly accompanied by the use of force, is subject to liability for a
trespass to such persons or things caused by the servant's unprivileged use of force
exerted for the purpose of accomplishing a result within the scope of employment.
(2) A master employing servants whose position brings them into argumentative
contacts with others may be found liable for batteries naturally arising out of
and resulting from such arguments. (Emph. added).
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vant who has acted for the purpose of serving his master, though
overzealously. The next extension was made by some courts in
cases where the servant, acting within the general scope of his
employment, became involved in an argument related to his job
or set off by some aspect of the job, especially if the job itself was
one which was argumentative in nature. While trying to collect a
bill, the collector gets into an argument and commits a battery
upon a surly debtor.40 Or a customer at a lunch counter complains
about the quality of meat he has been served, and the counterman
responds by striking him over the head with a club.41 Unlike the
previous categories, the factors of time, place and purpose are not
completely satisfied here. While the employee is at his job, and
the act occurs during his working hours, his purpose is mainly to
satisfy his own temper, not to serve his employer.
In negligence cases, where the servant has deviated to per-
form a task for his own purposes, the trend has been to find that
the deviation was minor and thereby sustain liability. In Ford v.
Reinoeh 1,42 an automobile salesman, driving a dealer's car back
to the showroom, stopped at a grocery for some butter and then
struck the plaintiff as the driver headed for his home to have sup-
per. And in Freehill v. Consumer's Co.,43 an iceman left his pre-
scribed district to go home and change his shoes, which were hurt-
ing him, and ran over the plaintiff, a small child, as the employee
was leaving his house. In these cases, the courts have played down
the purpose factor, or have emphasized the servant's overall pur-
pose to return to his employment after the short deviation, in
order to sustain findings that the servants were within the scope
of their employment."
The draft which was adopted generalized these specific categories into:
A master is subject to liability for the intended tortious harm by a servant to
the person or things of another by an act done in connection with the servant's
employment, although the act was unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable
in view of the duties of the servant. 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 245 (1957).
The comments make clear that if the servant is employed in a position which involves
the use of force, or is not uncommonly accompanied by the use of force, or which brings
him into argumentative contacts with others, then the use of force by the servant is
"not unexpectable," and is thus within the scope of his employment.
40 See, e.g., Moffit v. White Sewing Mach. Co., 214 Mich. 496, 183 N.W. 198 (1921).
41 Dilli v. Johnson, 107 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1939). See Langguth v. Bickford's, Inc.,
71 N.Y.S.2d 278, 272 App. Div. 907 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 982, 80 N.E.2d 363 (1948). Contra,
Fisher v. Hering, 38 Ohio App. 107, 97 N.E.2d 553 (1948).
42 120 Pa. Super. 285, 182 Atl. 120 (1935).
43 243 I11. App. 1 (1st Dist. 1926).
44 See also Krzikowsky v. Sperring, 107 Il. App. 493 (1st Dist. 1903); Embry v.
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Also, in the analogous field of Workman's Compensation,
many recent cases have allowed an injured employee to recover
from the employer after being injured in a fight which arose out
of a job connected activity.45 In Gregory v. Industrial Commission
of Ohio,4 6 for example, a driver for a non-unionized mine was
attacked and severely beaten by a group of union members. It was
found that the attack was a risk to which his employment had
exposed him, and thus arose out of his employment. Likewise, in
an Illinois case, Scholl v. Industrial Commission,4 7 a foreman had
fired an employee. The employee approached the foreman on his
way to work and asked him to reconsider. The two men quarreled
and the discharged employee became enraged, took out a pistol
and shot the foreman, killing him. An award of compensation was
sustained.
An increasing number of cases have taken the extended view
of scope of employment and have held the master liable for the
intentional torts of his servant where they are, in a broad sense,
job connected. Thus, where the employee is serving in an argu-
mentative position, as, for example, a bill collector, 48 or a bar
Reserve Natural Gas Co. of La., 124 So. 572 (La. 1929); Burger v. Taxicab Motor Co.,
66 Wash. 676, 120 Pac. 519 (1912).
45 See, e.g., Stewart v. Chrysler Corp., 350 Mich. 596, 87 N.W.2d 117 (1957); Newell
v. Moreau,-94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947); Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House, 46 N.J. Super.
425, 134 A.2d 789 (1957). See Horowitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws, 41 111. L. Rev. 311, 325-367 (1946); and Small, The Effect of Workman's
Compensation Trends on Agency-Tort Concepts of Scope of Employment, 12 N.A.C.C.A.
L.J. 21 (Nov. 1953), in which it is pointed out that workman's compensation principles
are increasingly affecting tort and agency. "Employment is coming to have the same
meaning for both." Id. at 52. And in Parotto v. Standard Paving Co., 345 Ill. App. 486,
494, 104 N.E.2d 102, 105-6 (Ist Dist. 1952), the court said:
We conclude, therefore, that the deviation from the terms of employment which
bars an employee from a recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act need
not be so substantial as one which would bar a third party from a recovery
against the employer of a tortious employee. While the distinction may be chal-
lenged from the standpoint of strict logic, it is not without sanction from the
standpoint of sound policy. To permit the employee or his personal representa-
tive to recover from an employer for the injury or death of the employee who
is killed while returning from a mission undertaken in violation of the terms of
his employment would allow him to take advantage of his own wilfullness ...
[Tihe deviation from employment rule . . . should not be used as a refuge by
the employer to escape application of the doctrine of "respondeat superior"
when a non-negligent third party seeks his common law remedy.
46 129 Ohio St. 365, 195 N.E. 699 (1935).
47 366 Ill. 588, 10 N.E.2d 360 (1937). Accord, Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 288 Ill. 126, 123 N.E. 278 (1919).
48 See Ferson, Principles of Agency 105 (1954); Seavey, Agency 157 (1964); Seavey,
Studies in Agency 261 (1949); Annot., Assault By Employee Collecting A Debt, 22 A.L.R.2d
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tender,49 the master may be responsible under this view if the
employee loses his temper and wilfully injures the plaintiff. The
result is not unexpectable in view the servant's job.5' The same
result may also be reached when the argument which precipitates
the wilful tort arises from the servant's performance of his job.
One such case is Stansell v. Safeway Stores.51 Plaintiff, a fourteen
year old girl, was sent by her mother to pick up groceries on a
relief order. The store manager was unable to find a relief order
on file. He called the girl's mother and argued with her over the
phone. He then escorted the girl out of the store, without any
groceries. The girl accused the manager of trying to gyp them out
of the groceries, and the manager responded by cursing the girl's
mother. When the plaintiff returned a curse to him, the manager
chased the girl, and struck and kicked her to the ground. In sus-
taining a judgment for the plaintiff, the court said:
. . . [I]t must be held that the evidence sustains the finding that
the wrongful acts here in question were committed while the
appellant's manager was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. He first lost his temper while he was handling the matter of
the order, which was clearly within the line of his duty. He be-
came more angry in answering a question asked by the girl with
respect to the groceries, and in replying to that question accused
her mother of lying and called her mother a vile name. The girl's
answering epithet increased his anger but did not change the na-
ture of the quarrel which arose in, from and as a part of his perfor-
mance of the duty for which he was employed.52
The extended view of liability for personal torts connected
with the employment has also been applied in cases where the de-
fendant's employee became embroiled in an argument after a traf-
fic accident or a near collision. In Tri-State Coach Corp. v.
Walsh,53 the defendant's bus driver started to make a right turn
1227 (1952); 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault & Battery § 144 (1963); 57 C.J.S., Master & Servant
§ 575(d) (1948); 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 245, comment a & illustr. 1.
49 Haworth v. Elliott, 67 Cal. App. 2d 77, 153 P.2d 804 (1945); Starnes v. Monsour's
No. 4, 30 So. 2d 135 (La. App. 1947); Guipe v. Jones, 320 Mich. 1, 30 N.W.2d 408 (1948);
Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 372, 415 (1954).
50 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 245 (1957). See note 39, supra.
51 44 Cal. App. 2d 822, 113 P.2d 264 (1941).
52 Id. at 827, 113 P.2d at 266.
53 188 Va. 299, 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948). For other traffic dispute cases, see Joyce v.
Southern Bus Lines, 172 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1949); Neary v. Hertz Corp., 231 F. Supp. 480
(D.D.C. 1964); Pritchard v. Gilbert, 107 Cal. App. 2d 1, 236 P.2d 412 (1951); Bova v.
St. Louis P.S. Co., 316 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. App. 1958); Schisano v. Brickseal Refractor Co.,
62 N.J. Super. 269, 162 A.2d 904 (1960); King v. Magaw, 104 Ohio App. 469, 150 N.E.2d
91 (1957); Felder v. Houston Transit Co., 203 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
LIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER
in front of plaintiff's car, which was stopped at the intersection.
Fearing that the bus was about to strike his fender, the plaintiff
shouted for the bus driver to stop. The driver stopped, but in
opening the bus door he struck the plaintiff's fender. An argument
ensued about whether the bus had given a turn signal, which
vehicle had done the crowding, and the respective rights of the
vehicles on the road. The bus driver lost his temper and struck
the plaintiff, causing him to lose control of his car, which started
forward and struck a building. The court ruled that the jury was
justified in finding that the employee had not abandoned the
scope of his employment.
In extending the master's liability to include personal torts
engendered by the servant's employment many cases have strongly
relied on recent liberal workman's compensation cases which have
allowed an employee to recover for injuries suffered in on-the-job
fights, even if they were not job related. In Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo,5 4 Judge Rutledge explained:
Men do not discard their personal qualities when they go to work.
Into the job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and
rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their tendencies
to carelessness and camaraderie, as well as their emotional make-
up. In bringing men together, work brings these qualities together,
causes frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into
carelessness, and for fun-making and emotional flare-up ...
These expressions of human nature are incidents inseparable from
working together.
Justice Traynor of California applied the above reasoning
quite broadly in Carr v. Win. C. Crowell Co.'5 The defendant was
a general building contractor. One of his employees had tacked a
temporary plate in place on the floor of a building under construc-
tion. The plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, told the em-
ployee not to go so fast, and he dislodged the plate and threw it
down to a lower part of the building. The defendant's servant
grumbled a bit, but found other work to do for fifteen minutes.
54 112 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1940). In Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y.
470, 471, 128 N.E. 711 (1920), Justice Cardozo stated:
The claimant was injured, not merely while he was in a factory, but because he
was in a factory, in touch with associations and conditions inseparable from
factory life. The risks of such associations and conditions were risks of the
employment.
55 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946).
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He then retrieved the plate and began to put it in place. The
plaintiff walked to the plate and kicked it off the floor. The defen-
dant's servant then threw his hammer at the plaintiff, striking him
on the head and seriously injuring him. A judgment for the
defendant contractor was reversed, since the injury was "an out-
growth of Enloe's employment," and "[n]ot only did the alter-
cation leading to the injury arise solely over the performance of
Enloe's duties, but his entire association with plaintiff arose out
of his employment on the building under construction. '"56
Thus, it would seem that the trend of decisions is to broaden
substantially the meaning of "scope of employment," and to in-
clude within its coverage personal failings of the servant which
have some causal relationship to his job.
OTHER BASES OF LIABILITY
Ratification
Ratification, or adoption, is a doctrine which is usually ap-
plied to bind a principal to a contract made by his agent in excess
of the agent's actual or apparent authority.5 7 However, it has also
been used in tort cases to sustain the employer's liability. Under
the theory of ratification, even though the act of an employee is
found to have been outside the scope of his employment at the
time it was performed, if the employer afterwards ratifies the act,
the authority to perform the act relates back to the time of com-
mission and makes the act authorized from its inception, and thus
within the scope of the servant's employment at that time.
58
In order for ratification to be applied, it is necessary that the
employer have knowledge of the employee's act and that he mani-
fest his intention to be bound by it, either expressly or by conduct,
such as by accepting the benefits of the unauthorized act. 59 Thus,
in a negligence case, Dempsey v. Chambers,6 0 an unauthorized
56 Id. at 658, 171 P.2d at 8.
57 "Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind
him but which was done or -professedly done on his account, whereby the act,. as to
some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him." 1 Restatement
(Second), Agency § 82 (1957).
58 Ibid. See comment b., and sections 100-102.
59 1 Restatement (Second), Agency §§ 97-99 (1957). See, e.g., Tauscher v. Doernbecher
Mfg. Co., 153 Ore. 152, 56 P.2d 318 (1936).
60 154 Mass. 330, 28 N.E. 279 (1891).
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helper took it upon himself to fill an order for coal, and, while un-
loading the coal, broke a window. The employer, with knowledge
of the unauthorized act and of the damage, sent the customer a
bill. It was held that the employer was responsible for the broken
window since by seeking the benefits of the unauthorized trans-
action he had ratified the entire transaction.
There are very few cases where ratification has been found
in wilful tort cases. Some of these have involved express approval
of the servant's act;6' more often the plaintiff attempts to show
ratification from the fact that the employer has retained the ser-
vant in his employment after the altercation without censure or
punishment. Several cases have found that the employer ratified
the servant's wilful tort by a failure to express disapproval and by
retaining him in his employ. 2 More often it is found that reten-
tion of the employee is only evidence of ratification, 63 or that re-
tention, coupled with other affirmative acts, 64 showed an adoption.
Negligent Hiring
Sometimes liability for the plaintiff's injuries can be placed
on the master directly instead of vicariously, even though the
actual wilful tort was committed by the servant. This result can
occur when the master himself is also at fault in some way, usually
by not taking proper and reasonable care in selecting or supervis-
ing the servant. This does not mean that merely because a servant
has committed a tort the master must have been careless in selecting
him. But if the master has knowledge that an employee has dan-
61 Caldwell v. Farley, 134 Cal. App. 2d 84, 285 P.2d 294 (1946); Gardin v. Baron, 11
N.J. Super. 215, 78 A.2d 297 (1951).
62 Jameson v. Gavett, 22 Cal. App. 2d 646, 71 P.2d 937 (1937); Bass v. The Chicago
& Northwestern Ry. Co., 92 Wis. 654 (1877); cf. Tauscher v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., supra
note 59.
63 Novick v. Gouldsberry, 173 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1949); McChristian v. Popkin, 75
Cal. App. 2d 249, 171 P.2d 85 (1946); cf. Edmunds v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
174 Cal. 246, 162 Pac. 1038 (1917). Contra, Chaney v. Fridgidaire Corp., 31 F.2d 977 (5th
Cir. 1929); Riddle v. Aero Mayflower Trans. Co., 73 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1954); Fisher v.
Hering, 38 Ohio App. 107, 97 N.E.2d 553 (1948).
It is rare to find ratification as the sole basis for sustaining the *master's liability.
Usually, the -court believes that the servant was within the scope of his employment,
and ratification is used as an added reason for affirming the lower court's judgment
against the employer. See, e.g., Novick v. Gouldsberry, supra.
64 Rosenberg v. J.C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939); State ex rel.
Kansas City Publ. Service Co. v. Shan, 345 Mo. 543, 134 S.W.2d 58 (1939) (employer's
attorney represented the employee in criminal trial and appeal).
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gerous propensities, such as a violent temper or sadistic tendencies,
and the master nevertheless hires him or keeps him in his employ,
the master is forseeably exposing people who will come into
contact with the servant to a serious risk of harm. The master can
therefore be found negligent in hiring or retaining the dangerous
servant, and will be responsible for the proximate consequences
of that negligence-an assault or other wilful injury inflicted
upon the plaintiff by the servant.
A Washington case, La Lone v. Smith,65 is illustrative of the
theory of negligent hiring. The landlord of an apartment building
retained one Trask as janitor. Trask quickly built a reputation
among the tenants as irresponsible and quarrelsome, and had ex-
hibited on many occasions a violent temper and a propensity for
drunkenness. He had assaulted one tenant in a previous episode, to
the landlord's knowledge. On the occasion precipitating the suit,
Trask was entertaining a friend and became inebriated. He sought
to borrow money from the plaintiff and the latter's refusal angered
him. He later berated the plaintiff, apparently over a parking
place, and then knocked the plaintiff down, jumped on him, beat
him, and sought to choke him. The court emphasized that res-
pondeat superior was not involved, but found liability because of
the landlord's negligence in retaining a dangerous servant in his
employ.
Non-delegable Duty
Under well established common law principles, carriers, inn-
keepers and telegraph companies, due to their quasi-public utility
status, owe a high duty of care to their customers and prospective
customers. 66 Likewise, business entities are charged with making
their premises safe for use by business invitees.6 7 Many courts have
held that these high duties are breached not only by negligently
created conditions or negligently conducted activities, but also by
failure to protect the plaintiff from wilful acts of people on the
65 234 P.2d 893 (1951). See Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915 (Mun. App. D.C. 1951);
cf. Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964). See generally,
Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 372, 390 (1954); Mechem, Outlines Agency § 403 (4th ed. 1952).
66 Restatement (Second), Torts § 314 A (1964).
67 Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 341 A, 343, 343 A (1964). See generally Prosser,
Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573 (1942); James, Tort Liability of
Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 Yale L.J. 605 (1954).
LIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER
premises, including servants and strangers. 68 Thus, in Frewen v.
Page,69 servants of the defendant's hotel invaded the room of the
plaintiffs, entirely proper hotel guests, and allegedly committed
an assault, false imprisonment and slander. In affirming a verdict
for the plaintiffs, the court said:
The guest is entitled to respectful and considerate treatment at
the hands of the innkeeper and his employees and servants, and
this right created an implied obligation that neither the inn-
keeper nor his servants will abuse or insult the guest, or engage
in any conduct or speech which may unreasonably subject him
to physical discomfort, or distress of mind, or imperil his safety.70
ILLINOIS DECISIONS
The Illinois courts have alternated between a narrow and
liberal attitude in scope of employment cases. In each of two
negligence cases, Kavale v. Morton Salt Co.7 and Parotto v. Stan-
dard Paving Co.,7" 2 the court affirmed a jury finding that the ser-
vant had been within the scope of his employment at the time of
the accident even though the servant in each case had been away
from his assigned place of employment for a long period of time
(three hours in Kavale; seven hours in Parotto), had deviated sub-
stantially geographically (the servant had returned to within sev-
eral blocks in Kavale, but was still four miles away in Parotto), and
had no clear intent of serving his master other than by driving
the master's vehicle back toward its garage after a long drinking
episode (and in Kavale it was not even clear that the servant was
driving back to the garage, since he testified that he really was
looking for a barber shop at the time of the accident). On the other
hand, in Cohen v. Fayette,73 the appellate court ruled, as a matter
of law, that a servant, who was supposed to be back at the company's
garage at 6:00 p.m., but who first stopped off at his home for din-
ner, and at 7:30 p.m. negligently injured the plaintiff at a distance
of a mile and one half from the company garage, was outside the
68 See, e.g., Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202 (1869) (carrier); Overstreet
v. Moser, 88 Mo. App. 72 (1901) (innkeeper); Robinson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 216 N.C.
322, 4 S.E.2d 889 (1939) (department store). For an extreme example, see Jenkins v.
General Cab Co. of Nashville, 175 Tenn. 409, 135 S.W.2d 448 (1940) (passenger in taxi
assaulted by her husband, who was the driver of the cab).
69 238 Mass. 499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921).
70 Id. at 505, 131 N.E. at 477.
71 242 Ill. App. 205 (1st Dist. 1926), aff'd, 329 Ill. 445, 160 N.E. 752 (1928).
72 345 111. App. 486, 104 N.E.2d 102 (1st Dist. 1952).
78 233 IMI. App. 458 (1st Dist. 1924).
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scope of his employment. Likewise, in Brill v. Davajon,74 the appel-
late court reversed a jury's finding that a cab driver was within the
scope of his employment when, for one dollar, he pushed a stalled
vehicle and ran into the plaintiff's car, even though the act took
place during the driver's working hours, the driver could have
been hired by a customer a moment later, and even though judi-
cial notice might perhaps be taken that cab drivers often perform
extra services, such as carrying luggage, for higher tips.
In wilful tort cases, the Illinois courts likewise have exhibited
various attitudes. The courts early recognized that the master
could be liable when the servant was employed in a position in
which force was authorized, as in a custodial position. However,
the Illinois courts at first required a clear showing of authority to
use force before the servant could be found to be within the scope
of his employment.
Thus, in Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Ross, 75 the servant,
Tucker, was employed as a flagman at a railroad crossing in the
City of Bloomington. His statutory duty was to signal travelers in
the public street and warn them of approaching locomotive en-
gines. A group of children had habitually played on the railroad
right of way nearby and the flagman had on several occasions
remonstrated with them. The boys had responded by splashing
paint on the flagman's watchhouse. On the occasion in question,
the flagman found the children on the right of way, grabbed the
plaintiff by the collar, accused him of painting the watchhouse, and
shook and kicked him. The boy threatened to throw a rock and he
cursed at the flagman, who then picked up a lump of coal and
threw it at the fleeing thirteen year old. The boy was struck in the
back and suffered permanent spinal damage.
The appellate court overturned a jury's verdict for the plain-
tiff and ruled that, as a matter of law, Tucker was outside the
scope of his employment at the time of the wilful act. The court
first held that the use of force by the flagman was not authorized,
expressly or impliedly. His express duties were merely to warn of
approaching trains at the intersection of the railroad crossing and
74 51 111. App. 2d 445, 201 N.E.2d 253 (1st Dist. 1964).
75 31 11. App. 170 (3d Dist. 1888).
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the public street. No authority existed to chase boys off the right
of way, if that was what he was doing, especially since the boys were
doing no harm to the tracks and were in no danger themselves.
Such action was not necessary or proper to carrying out his express
duties. Additionally, the court ruled that the evidence was clear
that the servant's act was purely personal and not connected with
the business or interests of his employer, since the servant himself
stated on cross-examination that he threw at the boy because the
boy had cursed him.76
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Brackman77 more
clearly illustrates the early view that authority to use force had to
vividly appear, and the facts that the act was committed during
working hours, on the job, and for the master's benefit were not
enough to support respondeat superior liability. In that case, the
plaintiff, seventeen years old, had been stealing a ride on the defen-
dant's car. He alleged that the defendant's servant, Gaynor, a
brakeman, had ordered the plaintiff off the moving train, and as
he held onto the side of the car the brakeman struck the plaintiff's
fingers with a stick, causing him to fall under the train. The plain-
tiff's ankle was crushed.
The court overturned the lower court's verdict for the plain-
tiff, and ruled that the brakeman, as a matter of law, was outside
the scope of his employment in striking the plaintiff. The court
emphasized testimony given by the conductor that it was not part
of the brakeman's duty to keep trespassers off the train or to eject
them; that if the brakeman discovered trespassers, he was to notify
the conductor. The printed rules of the company showed that
direction and control of the train was in the conductor, and that
the brakeman's duties were only to ride atop the train and apply
the brakes on signal. The court said:
76 Compare Kavale v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 71, where the court indicated
that the jury is not required to believe a servant who testifies that he was not in the
scope of his employment, at least where there are indirect contradictions or the testimony
is inherently improbable. See also Boland v. Gay, 201 Ill. App. 359 (3d Dist. 1916), and
Sutherland v. Gaccione, 8 Ill. App. 2d 201, 131 N.E.2d 130 (1st Dist. 1955).
See also Belt Ry. Co. v. Banicki, 102 Ill. App. 643 (1st Dist. 1902), where a railroad
watchman shot a trespasser. The court said that authority to keep trespassers away did
not involve authority to shoot them.
77 78 11U. App. 141 (2d Dist. 1898).
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Even if the servant does the act because he thinks it will benefit
the master, still if it is no part of the duty he was hired to perform
he is but a volunteer, and his act ought not to bind the master.78
While not a case of a custodial servant using force, Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Hancock79 is another example of the strict view on the
master's liability for wilful torts. The agent, Preston, was em-
ployed to sell and lease sewing machines for the defendant com-
pany on a commission basis. Preston caused the arrest of the plain-
tiff for maliciously damaging a sewing machine, but later dismissed
the charges. The contract of agency by which Preston was em-
ployed gave him power to make sales and collections, and provided
that if any special act were required of him, the power to perform
it had to be obtained in writing. No power to prosecute the plain-
tiff had been given. Both the Appellate and Supreme Courts of
Illinois held that the agent had no authority to commit the act and
that the employer was therefore not responsible for the wilful tort.
The fact that the act was done solely for the master's benefit,
though badly, was without legal significance.80
Actual authority to use force or to commit a wilful tort was
found in a number of cases. In contrast to the Brackman case,
above,8' the court in Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. King 2 found that
a railroad brakeman was authorized to eject trespassers, and he
made the company liable when he used excessive force in doing so.
The plaintiff, a thirteen year old boy, had attempted to board a
freight car. The brakeman pulled the boy off, and then hit him
with a thrown rock, causing the boy to fall beneath the wheels,
crushing his leg. The court found that all of the servants of the
defendant had been expressly instructed to stop the train and
put off any person who attempted to ride the train without pay-
ment of fare. The fact that the servant used excessive force in
executing his authority did not place the act outside of his employ-
ment. The court said:
78 Id. at 147. See Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Andrews, 78 Ill. App. 80 (2d Dist. 1898)
(dictum).
79 74 Ill. App. 556 (4th Dist. 1897).
80 In Kehoe v. Marshall Field & Co., 141 I11. App. 140 (1st Dist. 1908), a private
detective stationed at the defendant's store accused the plaintiff of stealing, and assaulted
her. Taking a highly restrictive view, the court said that authority to do general
detective work did not impart authority to arrest or assault suspected persons.
81 Supra note 77.
82 77 Ill. App. 582 (4th Dist. 1898), aff'd, 179 Ill. 91, 53 N.E. 552 (1899).
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When a servant is doing an act falling within the scope of his
employment, if he also wreaks his vengeance on the person or
thing he is dealing with, it is absolutely impossible to determine
where the sense of duty terminates and the thirst for vengeance
commences, and hence the law holds the master responsible for the
acts as a unit, .. 83
In an 1899 case, Alton Ry. Illuminating Co. v. Cox,84 a
special policeman was authorized to keep all persons out of a park
at certain hours. In trying to keep the plaintiff and his family out
of the park, an argument ensued and the employee struck the
plaintiff with a stone. A finding that the servant was within the
scope of his employment was affirmed. The policeman had specifi-
cally been authorized to use force as part of his job. That he had
exceeded the amount needed did not relieve the employer of
liability.
Another case where authority to commit the wilful tort was
found was Kovatich v. Ross-" There, the employee was a policeman
employed by the railroad to protect its property. If he caught
anyone destroying or carrying away the railroad's property, he was
expressly authorized to cause that person's arrest. The policeman
saw the plaintiff taking some grass from the defendant's right of
way, which the plaintiff claimed was customarily permitted. The
policeman chased him and shot him. The appellate court over-
turned a directed verdict for the employer and ruled that since
the servant was authorized to arrest, and since he was attempting
to arrest the plaintiff when he was shot, the jury could find that the
servant was acting within the scope of his employment.86
A liberalization in attitude was shown in a number of early
cases where the courts found that, although the servant did not
83 77 Ill. App. at 589. See Devine v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 141 Ill. App. 583 (1st
Dist. 1908), afl'd, 237 Ill. 278, 86 N.E. 689 (1908) (conductor); and Taneski v. St. Louis
Merchant's Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 230 Ill. App. 300 (4th Dist. 1923) (yard watchman).
84 84 Ill. App. 202 (4th Dist. 1899). Accord, Illinois Steel Co. v. Novak, 84 Ill. App.
641 (1st Dist. 1899), aff'd, 184 Ill. 501, 56 N.E. 966 (1900).
85 230 Ill. App. 330 (4th Dist. 1923).
86 See also Dean v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 183 Ill. App. 317 (lst Dist. 1913)
(Abstr.) (refusal to serve Negro); Busick v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 201 Ill. App. 63 (3d Dist.
1915) (special policeman arrested and assaulted apparent trespasser). The court in Kovatich
distinguished Haynie v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 194 111. App. 113 (4th Dist. 1915)
(Abstr.), in which it was shown that the railroad employee's duties were specifically
limited to questioning suspected trespassers and notifying the watchman if they did not
leave. The railroad was found not responsible when the employee shot and killed a
fleeing trespasser.
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have express authority to commit the wilful act, the nature of
his position gave him incidental authority to perform the act.
Thus, in West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Luleich,s7 a conducter ac-
cused the plaintiff of giving him a counterfeit dollar and caused
his arrest. The dollar was apparently legitimate and the plaintiff
was released. There was no evidence that the conductor had any
express authority to arrest passengers. However, the court reasoned
that the company itself had the power to expel from its trains
persons who were disorderly and persons who refused to pay their
fares; that the defendant, being a corporation, could only exercise
its power by its agents; that the conducter, being in charge of the
train, must therefore be the one who had the power.
A good statement of the theory of incidental authority is
found in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Dohertys
where an engineer threw a piece of coal at a boy and knocked him
off the train. Said the court:
The engineer was in the possession, management and control of
the engine, and he is to be presumed to have the powers com-
monly exercised by that class of servants. Nothing is more com-
mon then for courts to take notice of the power and duties of
conductors, engineers and other agents where common observa-
tion and experience furnishes knowledge of what they are. Plac-
ing the engineer in the management and control of the engine
could imply, in the absence of proof to the contrary, power to
keep trespassers off from it and we cannot doubt that he was acting
within the scope of his employment in what he did.s9
As was discussed in the first part of this article, there is a split
of authority on the liability of the employer of a bill collector
who loses his temper and assaults a debtor, though there is more
agreement on liability where the employee is sent to recapture
chattels and uses excessive force. In the latter case, the job involves
the use of force, or at least is not uncommonly accompanied by
force; in the former, in order to find liability the court must
recognize the "overzealous acts for the master's benefit" theory.
The three recapture cases in Illinois have presented a pro-
gression from a narrow view of scope of employment to a recogni-
S7 85 111. App. 643 (1st Dist. 1899).
88 53 Ill. App. 282 (2d Dist. 1893).
89 Id. at 286. See also North Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Gastka, 128 Ill. 613, 21 N.E. 522
(1889); George v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 197 Ill. App. 152 (4th Dist. 1915); but cf.
Pinkerton v. Gilbert, 22 Ill. App. 568 (lst Dist. 1887).
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tion that force is an incident to the position and therefore within
the scope of employment. In Titcomb v. James,90 Titcomb, a
partner in Titcomb & Pratt, ordered an employee to repossess
some furniture. The employee sent for the other partner, Mr.
Pratt, before retaking the goods, but the two of them thereafter
maliciously assaulted the plaintiff. It was held that Titcomb was
not responsible for the acts of his employee nor for those of his
partner, since he had not authorized them to assault the plaintiff.
The court apparently required a showing of express authority to
assault.
On the other hand, in Roman v. Silbertrust,1 the court in-
dicated in dictum that evidence that the servants of the defendant
were instructed to reclaim furniture and assaulted the plaintiff in
the process of doing so would render the defendant liable. The
progression was completed in Carlberg v. Spiegel Home Furnish-
ing Co 12 The defendant company had sold furniture to Frank
Troutman, who paid some installments and then moved. His
wife was the plaintiff's daughter. The defendant's crew were sent
to the plaintiff's home with directions to obtain the money owed
or to bring back the goods. When told that Troutman was not
there, one of the crew demanded that he be allowed to search the
house. The servant threw himself against the door, jammed the
plaintiff between the wall and the door, and held her there by
force while the other men searched the house. Nothing was found.
The appellate court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff for $1000
for forcible entry and assault, holding that the wilful acts were
performed in the line of the servant's employment and under the
instructions of the employer. In other words, the servants had
been authorized to recapture the chattels, a job which might
necessarily require the use of some force as an incident, and the
fact that the servants exceeded the force required would not inure
to the master's benefit.93
In the bill collection cases, two cases have found that the
90 57 Ili. App. 303 (lst Dist. 1894).
91 159 Ill. App. 485 (1st Dist. 1911).
92 178 Ill. App. 424 (Ist Dist. 1913).
93 Cf. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Holdfodt, 86 Ill. 455, 29 Am. Rep 43 (1877) (servant took
machine back from plaintiff under employer's instructions; employer liable for forcible
entry and punitive damages).
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servants had abandoned their employment when they committed
assaults, while one case applied the "overzealous servant" theory
and found the employer liable. The cases are not necessarily con-
tradictory, however.
In the first case, Callahan v. Hyland," the servant, Gegan, was
sent to collect an installment from Mrs. Hathaway. Mrs. Hatha-
way insisted that she had already paid, and stated that the plaintiff,
her landlady, could help her prove it. They went up to the plain-
tiff's apartment, where the plaintiff vouched for the fact that the
bill had been paid. The employee, who was drunk, became abu-
sive in his language and the plaintiff asked him to leave. Mrs.
Hathaway left, but Gegan remained outside the plaintiff's door.
Gegan turned to the plaintiff and said that he had come to get
money so he would get a little money out of her, and he com-
menced beating the plaintiff. A directed verdict for the defendant
was granted in the trial court and the appellate court affirmed,
holding that Gegan was outside the scope of his employment.
In Callahan, the servant could not be said to have been act-
ing for the master's benefit in attacking the plaintiff, since she was
not the debtor nor directly involved. The servant's drunkenness,
and his apparent intent to rob the plaintiff, indicate that he was
acting solely for his own purposes, and the master would not have
been liable even under the "overzealous servant" theory.
In a 1908 case, Klugman v. Sanitary Laundry Co.,95 the com-
plaint alleged that the defendant's laundryman, while delivering
a package of laundry, accused the plaintiff of defrauding the defen-
dant, used vile and approbrious language, threw her on the floor
and struck her. The court held that the complaint was insufficient
to charge the defendant with liability. "It is entirely consistent
with the allegation of the declaration that the servant beat the
plaintiff because he had a quarrel with her, and that he was not
doing nor attempting to do any act in the prosecution of the
business of the defendant, in the line of his employment, when he
made the assault."'96 Thus, the case was decided on a pleading
94 59 Ill. App. 349 (lst Dist. 1895).
95 141 Il. App. 422 (1st Dist. 1908).
96 Id. at 425-6.
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point and it is possible that if the plaintiff had better detailed the
nature of the argument to show that the dispute was connected
with payment of the laundry charges the court might have sus-
tained the complaint.
The "overzealous servant" theory was applied in Ziegen-
hein v. Smith,97 and liability was sustained when a servant, sent to
collect a bill, but told by the debtor that the payment was not yet
due, pulled the plaintiff from the door and threw him against a
bannister. The court said:
Was the agent, Slack, at the time of the assault, acting in good
faith in the line of his employment for the furtherance of the
business in which he was engaged and the interest of those by
whom he was employed? He was sent to the house of appel-
lee to collect money claimed by appellants to be due them. Meet-
ing with some opposition in making his collection he became over-
zealous, attempted to enter the house, threw appellee inside and
injured her. There was no proof that appellants, or any of them,
instructed their agents to commit the assault, but he was at the
time undoubtedly attempting, in good faith, in his own way, to
carry out the purpose for which he was sent. Under such circum-
stances there can be no doubt of the liability of the principal for
the act of the servant. 98
Another group of Illinois cases have involved situations
where a person, not in a custodial position, and not actually au-
thorized to force, acted for the master's benefit to protect his
property. Though several cases have sustained liability on the
theory of incidental authority, these cases probably fit better un-
der the theory used in Ziegenhein-overzealous acts of the servant
for the benefit of the master.
Thus, in Field v. Kane,99 an usher in the defendant's store
accused the plaintiff of stealing, seized her, took her to a room
and searched her. There was no showing that the usher's duties
expressly included protection of the property in the store, but it
is clear that the servant was overzealously acting for the benefit of
the master, who was found liable. Likewise, in Vrchotka v. Roth-
schild, °10 a salesman in the defendant's store accused the plaintiff
97 116 Ill. App. 80 (4th Dist. 1904).
98 Id. at 82. See McKay v. Irvine, 10 Fed. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1882) (jockey struck competing
jockey).
99 99 I1. App. 1 (1st Dist. 1901).
100 100 Il. App. 268 (1st Dist. 1902).
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of stealing, and searched him and took him to the police. The
court sustained liability, and stated:
The arrest was for purposes of searching for and recovering the
master's property, not with the objective of punishing crime
against the public .... The servant here was salesman and custo-
dian in one. Whatever the master might do in the protection of
his property he expected his servant to do in his absence .... If
in the performance of his duty he mistook the occurrence for it, or
exceeded his power, or employed an improper degree of compul-
sion, the mistake and the excess must be answered for by the
master.' 0 '
Metzler v. Layton 0 2 is one of the few Illinois Supreme Court
cases involving wilful torts of servants. There, robbers invaded
the office of a loan company, of which Layton was manager.
Layton and the plaintiff, a messenger boy, were locked in a closet.
They later escaped. Layton got a pistol and chased after the rob-
bers. Mistaking the plaintiff for a robber, Layton shot the plain-
tiff twice. The court sustained a jury's verdict for the plaintiff,
finding that the servant was acting primarily for the purpose of
protecting the master's property.
Where the servant's wilful act has arisen from a job con-
nected argument, most of the Illinois cases have not found liability
unless there was a showing of actual authority. However, one fair-
ly recent case seems to indicate a relaxation in the requirement.
In an early case, Horecker v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 0 3 the
plaintiff went to the defendant's depot to put his wife and son
on a train. The servant, a gateman, told the plaintiff that he would
have to buy a full fare ticket for his son. An altercation followed
and the plaintiff demanded to see the superintendant in order to
complain about the servant's conduct. The plaintiff did make a
complaint. Later, the servant, on his lunch hour, went through
the waiting room, saw the plaintiff, and asked the nature and
result of the plaintiff's complaint. The argument grew heated,
101 Id. at 271, quoting Staples v. Schmid, 18 R.I. 224, 231, 26 AtI. 193, 196 (1893).
See Coolahan v. Marshall Field & Co., 159 I11. App. 466 (Ist Dist. 1911); but cf. Waters v.
West Chicago St. Ry. Co. 101 Ill. App. 265 (1st Dist. 1902).
102 373 Ill. 88, 25 N.E.2d 60 (1940). Compare Shannessy v. Walgreen Co., 324 Ill. App.
590, 59 N.E.2d 330 (1st Dist. 1945), discussed infra at note 106.
103 238 Ill. App. 278 (1st Dist. 1925). See Buckley v. Edgewater Beach Hotel Co., 247
Ill. App. 239 (1st Dist. 1928).
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and the servant and another gateman, also off duty, brutally as-
saulted the plaintiff.
The appellate court ruled that a directed verdict should
have been given for the defendant. It emphasized that the ser-
vant's duties were merely to inspect tickets at the gate, apparently
inferring that there was no authority to use force. The court also
emphasized the fact that the servant was off duty, at lunch, at the
time of the assault, and stated that the injuries were inflicted "in
a spirit of vindictiveness, or to gratify personal animosity or to
carry out an independent purpose of their own .... "104
It would seem that the court placed undue emphasis on the
fact that the gateman was on his lunch hour. A servant may per-
form many acts for the master's benefit, or even as part of his
duties, on his own time.'0 5 For example, if the manager in the
Metzler case had been on a coffee break or at lunch when he saw
what looked like a hold-up, would there be any question of liabil-
ity if the manager committed a false arrest or a mistaken assault?
As for the question of benefit to the employer, although the gate-
man was not authorized to use force as part of his job, it is clear
that the argument itself--concerning the validity of half fare
status for the plaintiff's son-was for the master's benefit, and the
argument and the ensuing assault grew out of the servant's per-
formance of his duties.
In Shannessy v. Walgreen Co.,1 6 the defendant's servant was
the manager of a drug store. The plaintiff and his friend came
104 238 Ill. App. at 283.
105 "There is, however, authority for the proposition that the relation of employer
and employee does not necessarily begin or terminate the instant the particular duties the
employee has to perform begin or end. Thus, it has been held that where the employee
begins a quarrel while acting within the scope of the employment, and immediately
follows it up by a violent assault, his employer will be liable for that assault, since the
law, under the circumstances, will not undertake to determine when, in the course of the
assault, the employee ceased to act as such and acted upon his own responsibility." 6
Am. Jur. 2d, Assault & Battery § 142 (1963). See also Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 372, 435 et seq.
(1954). See, e.g., Rakowsky v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Ill. 1961) (lunch);
Becker v. Brummel, 319 Ill. App. 499, 48 N.E.2d 419 (1st Dist. 1943) (eating and drink-
ing in a tavern while looking for a customer); Flood v. Bitzer, 313 Ill. App. 359, 40
N.E.2d 557 (4th Dist. 1942) (dropping off a part on his way to his fiancee); East St. Louis
Connecting Ry. Co. v. Reames, 75 Ill. App. 28 (4th Dist. 1897), aff'd, 173 IlL. 582, 51 N.E.
68 (1898) (lunch); cf. Turnbow v. Hayes Freight Lines, 15 Ill. App. 2d 57, 145 N.E.2d 377
(1957) (driving to motel to go to sleep).
106 324 Ill. App. 590, 59 N.E.2d 330 (1st Dist. 1945).
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into the store for coffee at 3:30 a.m. While the plaintiff was in the
washroom, the manager approached the companion and said: "I
just as soon you didn't come in. Every time he comes in here he
causes trouble. The last time he was in here, he stole a hot water
bottle or electric heating pad. If he comes in here again I will
hit him with a baseball bat." After the two boys left, the plaintiff
was told what the manager had said. He started back into the store.
The manager yelled for him to "get the hell out of here," and
then, true to his word, he picked up a baseball bat and struck the
plaintiff three times, breaking his arm.
The appellate court overturned the trial court's verdict for
the plaintiff and ruled that the defendant should have received
a directed verdict, since the manager's act was either through
fear of violence by the plaintiff or in resentment over the previous
misconduct of the plaintiff, or in punishment for it, and he was
not engaged in protecting the defendant's property from theft or
damage or in recovering property which had been stolen.
It would seem that the court in Shannessy also took an overly
restrictive view of scope of employment. If the manager's motives
for attacking were important, as the court indicated by its sup-
positions as to what they were, shouldn't the determination of
that motive have been left to the trier of fact? The jury might
have felt that since the plaintiff was known to the manager to be a
trouble maker the manager was motivated by a desire to protect
the store and its property by trying to keep the plaintiff out.
Under an extended view of respondeat superior, a court could
reasonably conclude that the argument grew out of the manager's
performance of his duties-keeping an undesirable person out of
the store.
The liberal Illinois decision previously referred to is Bonnem
v. Harrison,'10 7 in which Rodgers, an employee of a service station
owner, was sent to an automobile agency to purchase a light switch
needed for repairing an automobile. The servant testified that
while he was inside the office of the automobile agency, the plain-
tiff, an employee of the dealer, yelled to him to move his car. The
servant offered the plaintiff the keys and told him to move the
107 17 IM. App. 2d 292, 150 N.E.2d 383 (2d Dist. 1958).
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car himself. The plaintiff replied "Big boy, come on and let us
get the car the hell out of here." Rodgers moved the car, returned
to the office and told the plaintiff that he should be more careful
how he spoke to customers, and that he should have asked his
name. The plaintiff replied, "I don't give a damn about your
name and that is all I say about you black boy," at which point
Rodgers struck the plaintiff with a broom.
The Appellate Court for the Second District overturned a
directed verdict for the defendant and ruled that the issue of
scope of employment should have been decided by the jury. Quot-
ing from American Jurisprudence, the court stated:
Whether the extent of his departure from the scope of his employ-
ment, or the area of his service, was so unreasonable as to make
of his act of deviation an independent journey of his own, rather
than a mere detour or one incidental to his employment, is a
question of degree which depends on the facts of the case and is a
matter for the determination of the jury, unless the deviation is
so great, or the conduct so extreme, as to take the servant outside
the scope of his employment and make his conduct a complete
departure from the business of the master. When the deviation
and its purpose are not in dispute, and it appears beyond reason-
able controversy that the purpose had no connection with the
duties of the servant, there is no liability, and it is the duty of the
court to dismiss the action or direct a verdict, or, if a verdict has
been rendered in favor of the plaintiff, to set it aside on motion.
On the other hand, in cases where the deviation is slight and not
unusual, the court may, and often will, as a matter of law, deter-
mine that the servant was still executing his master's business.
Cases falling between these extremes will be regarded as involving
merely a question of fact, to be left to the jury or other trier of
such questions. 0 8
The court concluded that Rodger's acts and motives did not,
beyond reasonable disagreement, indicate a complete departure
from the employment, and "whether or not his action was a de-
parture from his employment or was his own method of furthering
his employer's interest, no matter how poorly conceived, was a
proper question for the jury to determine.
However, the most interesting part of the decision is found in
the following language:
The defendant-employer had a chance to judge and pass upon
Rodger's qualifications and the duties to be imposed upon him,
108 Id. at 298, 150 N.E.2d at 386.
109 Id. at 299, 150 N.E.2d at 386.
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prior to employment. The employer must have known his tem-
perament, his mentality and his capacity to act under stress and
unusual circumstances and, having selected him as his employee,
he sent him out into the world to act in his behalf. He should,
therefore, be responsible for his acts committed in and during
the course of his employment, and while acting within the scope
of his authority. Whether or not he was so acting at the time in
question is a very disputed question of fact which should have
been submitted to the twelve judges of fact, the jury. n 0
This opinion comes very close to adopting the theory under-
lying the decisions, previously discussed,"" which found liability
for all injuries arising out of arguments in the course of the ser-
vant's employment. The dispute would seem to have been largely
personal, growing out of the frustration by the servant at having
to move his car and over a racial slur. Yet, the court seems to say
that since the servant's employment exposed him to the condi-
tions which led to the assault, and it would not have happened
but for the employment, the jury could validly find that the
action was within the scope of the servant's employment. 12
Where the servant's act is purely personal, though committed
during working hours, except for the Bonnem case, the Illinois
decisions agree that the servant is outside the scope of his employ-
ment as a matter of law and the master will not be liable unless he
ratifies, is himself at fault, or owed the plaintiff a non-delegable
duty.
Thus, in Ulrich v. Knickerbocker Ice Co."' and Mozk v.
Chicago City Ry. Co.," 4 drivers of carts struck at small boys run-
ning near their wagons, not shown to be trying to get on. In
Schindler v. Link Belt Mach. Co.,"5 a guard assigned to protect
employees on the way home during a strike got into a purely per-
sonal altercation with a person not connected with the strike.
And in Apex Smelting Co. v. Burns,116 a guard went berserk and
110 Id. at 300, 150 N.E.2d at 387.
111 Supra at notes 51 et seq.
112 Cf. C.A. Dunham Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Ill. 2d 102, 156 N.E.2d 560 (1959),
adopting a broad "but for" test for "arising out of the employment" in workmen's com-
pensation cases.
118 191 Ill. App. 337 (Ist Dist. 1915) (Abstr.).
114 80 Ill. App. 411 (Ist Dist. 1898).
115 197 Ill. App. 373 (1st Dist. 1916) (Abstr.).
116 175 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1949). See Ewald v. Pielet Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 310
Ill. App. 218, 33 N.E.2d 930 (1st Dist. 1941) (watchman in junk yard called plaintiff into
the yard, cussed him and hit him with a revolver); Shein v. John R. Thompson Co., 225
Ill. App. 490 (1st Dist. 1922) (Plaintiff struck by a plate thrown by the defendant's servant
while plaintiff seated in defendant's lunch room).
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set fire to the plaintiff's plant. In each of these cases it was ruled
that the servant was outside the scope of his employment as a
matter of law.
The doctrine of ratification has been asserted as a basis of
liability in several cases, without success thus far. In each of the
three Illinois cases, the alleged act of ratification was the retention
of the employee in the master's employment after the commission
of a personal and wilful tort. In Buckley v. Edgewater Beach
Hotel Co., n 7 the employee was a security guard at a hotel, charged
with keeping the premises free from disorderly conduct. He got
into an argument, apparently personal in nature, which culmi-
nated in a free-for-all fight. After first finding that the intentional
assault was without the scope of the guard's employment, the court
ruled that the mere retention of the servant for a period of time
after the improper act did not constitute a ratification by the mas-
ter. The court delimited what would be required to show ratifica-
tion by saying:
It is true that a principal, while not present, may ratify the acts of
his servant so as to become personally liable. In our opinion there
must be some such affirmative act as would indicate an expressed
intention to concur in the acts of the servant. We do not believe
that the mere retention of a servant alone would be sufficient." 8
The theory of negligent hiring has likewise found limited
application in Illinois. The theory was asserted in Pascoe v.
Meadowmoor Dairies,"9 without success. There, the servants,
helpers on dairy products delivery trucks, went on a drinking
binge after finishing work and later returned to a delicatessen on
the route of one of them. They there robbed and raped the owner's
wife and fourteen year old daughter, and one of them shot the
wife several times. Testimony was offered that the servants were
often intoxicated, the servants themselves admitting that they
were drunk at least two times a week. The plaintiffs charged that
the defendants were negligent in retaining the servants with
knowledge of their dangerous propensities, and they specifically
117 247 I1. App. 239 (Ist Dist. 1928).
118 Id. at 246. Accord, Neville v. Chicago & Alton Ry. Co., 210 Ill. App. 168 (Ist Dist.
1918) (Abstr.); Wilkinson v. Hart's Drive-In, 338 I11. App. 210, 86 N.E.2d 870 (2d Dist.
1949) (Abstr.).
119 41 Ill. App. 2d 52, 190 N.E.2d 156 (Ist Dist. 1963).
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acknowledged that liability was not sought under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. The appellate court found that there was no
basis for concluding that the defendants could anticipate any
harm to the plaintiffs by their act of hiring and retaining the two
servants. Justice Burke stated:
The defendants, as reasonable men, could not have foreseen that
Davenport and Fields, who according to the plaintiff's evidence
were steady workers over a long period of time and whose only
vice was that they were addicted to drinking intoxicating liquor to
excess, would suddenly and without any apparent reason embark
on an orgy of rape, robbery and attempted murder. 12
The concept of non-delegable duty has been used in several
cases to support judgments against quasi-public utilities and busi-
ness entities.121 In Callaghan v. Harvey,22 an innkeeper was held
responsible for the unwarranted and unauthorized act of a menial
servant who had a guest arrested for allegedly cutting a towel off
of a hook. The court rested liability on the innkeeper's duty to pro-
vide safe premises for his guests, and said that the employer must
be responsible for the wrongful act of his servant in violating the
duty the hotel owed to the guest. And in McMahon v. Chicago
City Ry. Co.,123 liability was based on the carrier's duty to protect
120 Id. at 58, 190 N.E.2d at 159. In Ewald v. Pielet Scrap Iron & Metal Co., supra
note 116, a junk yard watchman called the plaintiff into the yard and hit him with
a pistol. The plaintiff sought recovery against the employer under the theory of respondeat
superior. The plaintiff offered testimony, however, that the watchman was in the habit
of getting drunk and had previously assaulted other persons. The court found the master
not liable, and said:
If the plaintiff's theory is that the defendants are liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, the fact that the watchman had previously assaulted some-
one else, at a different time and place, would throw no light on the assault in
the instant case but, on the contrary, would be very prejudicial and we think
that the court erred in admitting such evidence.
310 Ill. App. at 222, 33 N.E.2d at 932. The plaintiff's attorney thus learned a hard lesson.
The plaintiff's complaint should have had an alternative count charging negligent hiring
and retention of the dangerous servant.
121 "The defedant is liable for any injury caused to its passengers by any [assault]
[abuse] [intentional harm] to them by an employee of the carrier [then on duty]." I.P.I.
100.04 (1961). See also I.P.I. 100.01 (1961).
"The [owner] [occupant] of property [owes an invitee] [owed the plaintiff] the duty
to exercise ordinary care [to keep the property reasonably safe for use by the (invitee)
(plaintiff)] [for his safety]." I.P.I. 120.06 (1961).
122 225 Ill. App. 353 (1st Dist. 1922). Cf. Galesburg Sanitarium v. Jacobson, 103 Ill.
App. 26 (2d Dist. 1902) (assault by servant of mental institution on patient); Schramko
v. Boston Store of Chicago, 243 Ill. App. 251 (1st Dist. 1927) (department store liable for
false imprisonment and slander of customer).
123 239 Ill. 334, 88 N.E. 233 (1909). Accord, Chicago & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Flexman,
103 Ill. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 33 (1882) (brakeman punched passenger).
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its customers from harm, including harm from the unauthorized
acts of its servants, in that case an assault by the conductor of a
street car.
A somewhat novel theory was used in Lipscomb v. Cop-
page124 to sustain the liability of the owner of a tavern for the
wilful assault and murder by a part-time bartender. Coppage was
one of three bartenders employed by the defendant. Lester was
the head bartender and was in charge in the absence of the owner.
Coppage, who had been drinking himself, became embroiled in
an argument with a patron, Lipscomb, and his wife, and he ordered
them to leave. When Coppage went off duty, the argument was
resumed outside the tavern. Coppage had taken a revolver with
him and he shot and killed Lipscomb.
Count three of the plaintiff's complaint alleged that Lester,
the supervising bartender, had permitted Coppage to become in-
toxicated and quarrelsome, and to display a loaded revolver, and
that he knew or should have known of Coppage's violent conduct
and should have prevented him from assaulting the plaintiff's
intestate. There was evidence that Lester had served Coppage the
liquor and had seen him take out a revolver from a fire alarm box.
He also witnessed both altercations with Lipscomb.
The appellate court upheld the complaint and the verdict for
the plaintiff, saying that:
The circumstances brought out in the evidence would indicate a
potentiality of violence which should have been apparent to Lester.
Under those circumstances a duty would then devolve upon Lester
to call the police, and a violation of that duty under the doctrine
of respondeat superior could be laid upon the defendant Feld-
man.12
5
Thus, the employer was responsible not for the acts of the servant
who committed the wrongful act, but for the failure of another
servant to control or prevent the wrongdoer from committing the
act. The duty to take action was part of Lester's job responsibili-
ties, and his failure to act was negligence within the scope of his
employment.
124 44 Il. App. 2d 430, 197 N.E.2d 48 (lst Dist. 1963).
125 Id. at 430r, 197 N.E.2d at 57.
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CONCLUSION
The trend of decisions in the United States, and specifically
in Illinois, seems clearly toward expansion of the scope of "scope
of employment." This trend validly reflects the underlying justifi-
cation for respondeat superior-that the employer is the one best
able to absorb the injured person's losses as a risk of doing business
and to pass them on to society as a whole.
CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW
Copyright 1968, Chicago-Kent College of Law
PUBLISHED SPRING AND FALL BY THE STUDENTS OF
CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, 10 N. FRANKLIN STREET, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Subscription Price, $4.00 per year Single Copies, $2.50 Foreign Subscription, $4.50
EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor-in-Chief
GERALD J. SMOLLER
Associate Editors
RICHARD A. BRAUN WILLIAM L. GREENE
Staff
DWIGHT ADAMS
ALLYN A. BROOKS
FRANK J. DoTI
EDWARD A. HOFFMAN
WILLIAM J. JOOST
JERRY C. LAGERQUIST
ALABAR F. SLEs
CHARLES W. STAUDENMEYER
ROBERT A. TINGLER
Candidates
CHARLES W. JAKOPICH MICHAEL D. MARRS ROBERT W. WEBB
BOARD OF MANAGERS
RALPH L. BRILL, Chairman and Faculty Advisor
ROBERT J. O'CONNELL FRED HERZOG JAMES K. MARSHALL WM. F. ZACHARIAS
The College assumes no responsibility for any statement
appearing in the columns of the Review
VOLUME 45 SPRING-SUMMER, 1968 NUMBER I
